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Note on the Text

Humanomics Spans the Two Worlds of Adam Smith
Sociality and Economy
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permission.
Smith, Vernon L. and Bart J. Wilson. 2017. "Sentiments, Conduct, and Trust in the
Laboratory," Social Philosophy and Policy 34(1): 25-55 (in Chapters 3-4, 6).
Reprinted with permission.
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Games: Beneficence Cannot be Extorted," Games and Economic Behavior 109:
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Wilson, Bart J. 2010. "Social Preferences Aren't Preferences," Journal of Economic
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permission.
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A persistent conflict in modern human life arises from living simultaneously in two worlds governed by distinct rule systems. Human beings
are first governed by the caring other-regarding rules of our close-knit
social groups, like our families, extended families, neighbors, and friends.
We do good things for such people, and we refrain from doing bad things
to such people because we personally know them. On an individual level,
we specifically know how to be helpful, kind, and compassionate to them.
They have names like Candace and Ryan, Stephanie and Steve, Caroline
and Kyle, and we have firsthand knowledge about them. We know such
mundane things as which friend can take which jokes (and which ones
cannot take jokes at all) and such poignant things as what our neighbor
needs right now is someone to sit with while she copes with some traumatizing news. With love and solidarity we treat those people personally
known to us as the dear individuals they are.
Because we cannot possibly know the specific circumstances of everyone
beyond our circle of kith and kin, the extended order of markets treats
everyone we do not personally know precisely the same. We do not
personally know which farmer or wholesaler or trucker or grocer will
best serve us in delivering food from the farm to our kitchen table, so we
open it up for competition to decide who will serve us well. Wisconsinites,
Kansans, Canadians, Mexicans, Chileans, New Zealanders, Czechs, and
even the French all vie to supply us with what we desire: cheese and wheat,
pork and tomatoes, grapes and kiwis, beer and wine. The same rules apply
to everyone whom we do not personally know - do not harm by stealing,
deceiving, or breaching a promise - and we let freedom of choice among
them, called competition, do the rest. Whoever supplies the tastiest cheese
at the best prevailing prices gets our money. Today that might be Robert
Wills from Cedar Grove Cheese in Plain, Wisconsin, but next week it
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might be Will and Hilary Chester-Master from Abbey Home Farm in
Cirencester, United Kingdom. If specifying the actual names of cheesemakers googled from the Internet feels a bit too particular, that is our
point. We do not personally know the names of the multitudes of people
who produce the far greater part of those daily goods and services we stand
in need of.
If the solidarity and love for our fellow compatriots that we do not
personally know led us to forbid the importation of goods from other
producers that we also do not personally know - say, like those in Asia or
Europe - we would destroy the ability of markets to support specialization
and thereby create wealth and human betterment. Such conflict prominently takes the form of sharp controversies over inequality in the distribution of income and wealth, and whether or to what extent wealth
creation generates inequality through innovation and the subsequent diffusion of its benefits. 1
Similarly, applying impersonalized rules of competition, like that of
"today you win my patronage, tomorrow you lose" to our more intimate
social groupings would crush the ability of friends, family, and neighbors
to forge and strengthen the bonds of human sociality. Imagine how many
friends we would have if we treated them like we treat the owners of
restaurants that we patronize: No, I'm sorry, your taste in wine is not
a good fit for dinner this week; the Johnsons are coming over. Maybe next
week, though? "So," says the economist and social philosopher F. A. Hayek,
"we must learn to live in two sorts of world at once" (1988, p. 18).
Although Hayek articulated the idea of living in two different worlds,
and the conflict it engenders, the origin, substance, and functioning of
these two parallel worlds was made comprehensible originally in two books
written over two centuries ago by Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral
Sentiments in 1759 (hereafter Sentiments in the text, and TMS in citations)
and An Inquiry into the Na tu re and Causes of the Wealth ofNations in 1776
(hereafter Wealth in the text, and WN in citations). We use the neologism
"humanomics" to refer narrowly here to the study of the very human
problem of simultaneously living in these two worlds, the personal social
and the impersonal economic.
In the roots of their common origin in human life, Adam Smith's work
enables us to understand these two worlds as one. He modeled both worlds
in a manner that we believe seamlessly connects the two in a unified social
and ethical science of human beings. It is our aim to further develop,

articulate, and demonstrate that model for contemporary social science
theory and experiment. Sentiments did not fare well in the academy;
Wealth fared far better. The two works were once even seen as contradictory. Jacob Viner, for example, a leading scholar in the intellectual
history of economics, could write, "But it can be convincingly demonstrated, I believe, that on the points at which they come into contact there is
a substantial measure of irreconcilable divergence between the Theory of
Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations with respect to the character
of the natural order" (Viner 1991, p. 93). And again, "Many writers,
including the present author at an early stage of his study of Smith, have
found these two works in some measure inconsistent" (Viner 1991, p. 250).
This so-called Adam Smith problem was corrected in a revisionist literature that greatly elevated the status of Smith's first book. 2 These corrections
in the intellectual understanding of Smith, coming two centuries after
Wealth was published, and a century after the neoclassical marginal revolution do not close the immense gap between how Smith and modern
scholars think about human action. 3 Our own experience is that of having
stumbled into a gradually deepening appreciation of the unifying principles of social science in Smith's two great works. That path began and
received illumination from unanticipated and unpredicted results in
experimental studies. First in markets, where the standard self-interest
model of action under strict private information predicted outcomes far
more accurately than was thought possible by contemporary professional
economists; and second, the same utility maximizing model of action in
simple ultimatum and trust games failed decisively to predict

2

1

Thomas Piketty (2014) and Deirdre McCloskey (2016).

2

3

3

Leonidas Montes (2003, 2004) examines this literature and other aspects of Smith's
thought.
In the last edition of Sentiments, Smith stated that in the first edition he had indicated his
intention "to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the
different revolutions which they had undergone in the different ages and periods of society; not
only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever
else is the object of law. In ... [Wealth] ... I have partly executed this promise.... What
remains, the theory of jurisprudence, which I have long projected, I have hitherto been
hindered from executing, by the same occupations which had till now prevented me from
revising the present work. Though my very advanced age leaves me, I acknowledge, very little
expectation of ever being able to execute this great work to my own satisfaction; yet, as I have
not altogether abandoned the design, and as I wish still to continue under the obligation of
doing what I can, I have allowed the paragraph to remain as it was published more than thirty
years ago, when I entertained no doubt of being able to execute every thing which it
announced" (Adam Smith 1790). We do not know whether that plan, if followed, would
have brought a fuller integration of Smith's remarkable two books, and a less ambitious
attempt by neoclassical economists to reduce all human action to an exercise in utility
maximization.
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systematically replicable results.4 This book is largely a consequence of our
attempt to give meaning to this disjunction, where none of the attempts to
do so have been satisfactory. Sentiments gave us an unexpectedly fresh
framework.

people.7 Thus, if the modern economist espouses naked self-interest as the
foundation for economic decision-making, she does so incompatibly with
the founder of the discipline and more generally with the genius of the
Scottish Enlightenment. There are moral rules, just rules, that govern our
conduct in impersonal markets.
Smith's friend David Hume likewise circumscribes market behavior
within rules when he distinguishes interested commerce (what the economic historian Douglass North calls impersonal or market exchange)
from disinterested commerce (what North calls personal or social
8
exchange). Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1755, offers four meanings for interest in eighteenth-century
usage; while the first meaning of interest is "concern, advantage, good,"
the fourth meaning, which applies here, is "regard to private profit." 9
Hume recognizes that promises were invented for interested commerce
to "bind ourselves to the performance of any action" (1740, p. 335). While
with disinterested commerce we "may still do services to such person as
I love, and am more particularly acquainted with, without any prospect of
advantage; and they may make me a return in the same manner, without
any view but that of recompensing my past services," the same is not true of
our impersonal intercourses. We precisely engage in mutually benefiting
and impersonal exchange for the distinct prospect of a private profit, and
we voluntarily do so only with promises, "the sanction of interested
commerce of mankind" (p. 335).
Smith's first and lesser known work Sentiments is a deep and insightful
study in disinterested commerce that creates human social betterment and
also explains the origin of justice. In Wealth we learn that the pursuit of
private benefit, under the governing rules of justice, is what enables
specialization and wealth creation for human economic betterment.
Smith sees these two forms of human betterment as the result of gradual
socioeconomic development. In this our project dovetails with Deirdre
McCloskey's grander narrative in Bourgeois Equality (2016, pp. 203-4):

4

SOCIAL ORDER
Contrary to popular belief, Adam Smith does not argue, famously or
infamously, that humans are primarily motivated by self-interest. Even in
Wealth, he speaks not of self-interest but of one's "own interest," which
includes prudence but is always mediated by what "other men can go along
with." 5 Smith renownedly says that "it is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of
their advantages" (WN, pp. 26-7, our italics). 6 But acting in one's "own
interest,, need not entail putting one's own interest above another's interest
in commerce, which is what acting with self-interest quite fundamentally
means then and now. In Sentiments Smith often uses "selfish" to clearly
demark the narrower meaning of self-interest.
A deeper reading of Wealth reveals Smith's qualification of the meaning
of"own interest." Appealing to the self-love of the butcher, the brewer, and
the baker means "allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own
way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice" (WN, p. 664, our
italics). If that qualification is unpersuasive, he elaborates later when
discussing competition: "Every man, as long as he does not violate the
laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own
way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those
of any other man, or order of men" (WN, p. 687, our italics). As part of
acting in one's own interest, we, like the political theorist Ryan Hanley,
read Adam Smith as having a commitment to the equality and dignity of all
4

5

6

F. A. Hayek (1945) is an exception; the results from market experiments demonstrate
Hayek's interpretation of the role of prices in coordinating economic activity. See Vernon
Smith (1982).
Tellingly, book 5 in volume 2 of Wealth is the first and last time Smith uses the word "selfinterest," and then it is to describe "the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy [in Rome]"
(p. 789).
In the same paragraph, preparing us for this quotation, we find an echo from Sentiments:
"In civilized society he (man) stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance
of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few
persons ... and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only" (WN, p. 26).

Smith had two invisible hands, two outcomes of (in his uncharacteristically clumsy
phrase) "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty." One was the invisible
hand of the marketplace, whose effects are occasionally noted in [Wealth]. For
example, to mention Smith's most original economic contribution, the marketplace in labor equalizes the wage-plus-conditions in Scotland with those in
England, within social and legal limits, because people move from one place to
7
8

See Ryan Hanley (2009) and also Samuel Fleischacker (2004).
9
Douglass North (1990, 2005).
Samuel Johnson (1755).

5
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the other until it is so, as though directed by an invisible hand. Likewise the
invisible hand gently pushes people out of their solipsistic cocoons to consider
what is valued in trade by other people. "Every individual ... neither intends to
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it." ...
[The other was the invisible hand of the impartial spectator,] the social one as
against the economic. We become polite members of our society by interacting on
the social stage - note the word, "inter-acting." Smith in [Sentiments] did not
believe, as his teacher Hutcheson did, that in achieving social peace and prosperity
we can depend on natural benevolence.... Nor did he believe, as many economists
still understand him to do, in a fuzzy version of Mandeville' s hardwired opposite of
cooperation, a macho competiveness, greed is good.
Against inherited niceness or nastiness, as I have noted, Smith repeatedly emphasized in [Sentiments], as he did also in [Wealth], that during their lives people
change, shaped by society and, it may be, by their own impartial spectator. In the
phrase appropriate to a time of apprenticeships, people were "brought up to a trade."

contribution of the neoclassical marginal revolution. 11 A buyer earns
a profit on each unit purchased from a seller equal to the difference
between the value to the buyer and the price paid for the item. Sellers are
assigned units with values representing their cost of supplying units to the
market. Sellers' profits are the difference between selling price and personal
cost. Hence, buyers are motivated to buy at low prices, and sellers to sell at
high prices. Max-U is achieved simultaneously for all buyers and sellers at
the competitive market clearing price where the quantity sellers could
profitably sell equaled the quantity buyers could profitably buy.
Trading in the experimental market is organized using the two-sided
"double auction'' procedure common in early commodity and securities
market trading. Buyers announce bids to buy, sellers announce asks to sell,
with contracts effected either by a buyer accepting the lowest ask price, or
a seller accepting the highest bid price. From the first experiments down to
the present day, these markets converge quite rapidly and robustly to the
competitive equilibrium price under repetitions across time. This victory for
the application of Max-U theory to markets is somewhat marred, however,
in that Jevons believed that such results only obtain if all participants in the
market have complete and perfect information on supply and demand and
therefore the clearing price. But in the experiments, each buyer and seller
possess only private decentralized information on the small fragment of the
total supply and demand that defined their part of the overall market.
Consequently, the experimental results not only confirm the efficacy of
Max-U to markets but under far weaker conditions than Jevons, and the
generations of economists that followed him, thought necessary.
Jevons and neoclassical economists erred in thinking that the participants in markets needed the same information that Max-U theorists
needed to compute an equilibrium. In effect they impose their mental
model of market outcomes on the behavior of the market participants.
Adam Smith did not make this error in either Sentiments or Wealth. His
modeling perspective is first that of the actor, her feelings, reactions and

6

Smith's aim in Sentiments is to understand how and why personal forms of
other-regarding or moral action emerge and are sustained in our more
intimate groupings and constitute the substance of human sociality. It is
a work in psychology and economics applied to social interaction well
before either had been established as independent fields of inquiry. Smith
was yet to write Wealth, often identified with the founding of economics,
but it would take another 125 years for psychology to be founded as
separate and distinct from philosophy. To understand Sentiments we
must learn the meaning conveyed in the eighteenth-century words and
concepts Smith used, thereby enabling us to learn to think in his language,
important in engaging the substance of his thought, the topic of Chapter 2.
SENTIMENTS PREDICTS WHERE THE NEOCLASSICAL
MODEL FAILS

Neoclassical economics, with its firm methodological foundations in utility
maximization ("Max-U''), received unexpectedly strong evidential support
from the study of experimental markets beginning in the 1960s. 10 In these
experiments participants are identified as either buyers or sellers in a series
of trading periods. Buyers are assigned private values for units of the item
they could buy or attempt to buy in each trading period. Multiple units
have declining values reflecting diminishing marginal utility - the key
10

So abbreviated and further discussed by Deirdre McCloskey (2006). The original experiments are reported in Vernon Smith (1962); see Douglas Davis and Charles Holt (1993)
for a summary of the many subsequent such experiments; for a discussion of why the
results were "surprising," see Vernon Smith (2008a, pp. 193-197).

11

7

William Stanley Jevons (1862, 1871) was particularly influential in the English-speaking
world in propagating the Max-U calculus of supply and demand theory. From Richard
Howey (1989), we learn that in 1862 Jevons sent his paper "Notice of a General
Mathematical Theory of Political Economy" to the British Association for the
Advancement of Science; though the paper was read, only a short abstract was published
in the proceedings. But the event clearly established Jevons's priority for the first articulation of the marginal utility and general equilibrium theories that became part of the
1870s neoclassical revolution. Serendipitously, Smith (1962) published experimental tests
of supply-and-demand theory on the centenary year of Jevons's contribution.
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interactions, and second the consequences for society or economy of that
perspective.
Max-U in the neoclassical vision is proffered not only as a theory of
markets but as the modeling foundation for all human decision-making.
The model fails decisively to predict the extent of cooperation in the study
of two-person interactive games, including ultimatum and trust games,
beginning in the 1980s and popular in laboratory experiments ever since the
l 990s. 12 Sentiments reconciles the discordant results between market and
two-person interactive experiments, and provides fresh insight into the
observed personal social conduct in the two-person games. Smith was not
a utilitarian in the neoclassical sense of Max-U. (In what follows we use
((utilitarian" in the sense of pertaining to utility, not in the sense of pertaining
to the philosophical doctrine of utilitarianism.) For Smith ((self-love" is
necessarily at the core of our being, but in the responsible individual's prudent
maturation, conduct is shaped by learnt other-regarding rules of social order
originating in our capacity for mutual sympathetic fellow-feeling.
Behavioral and experimental economists offered other ways of reconciling
the predictive failures of Max-U in the form of "social preference" and
"reciprocity" theories. 13 Since neither of these ex post resolutions are appropriate for characterizing Smith's model, Sentiments deserves our careful
attention if we are to understand why and how modern thinking turned
away from the classical tradition, ill-preparing us for the disruptive discoveries in two-person interactive games. It is an error common to the modern
mind to suppose that any insightful earlier conceptual breakthrough in
understanding must surely have been integrated into the subsequent literature. Indeed many of the insights in Sentiments were subsequently discov14
ered, and the psychology of sentiment has been independently reevaluated.
But we will show that the model in Sentiments - the thought framework - is
distinctive and relevant for a twenty-first-century social science of human
beings.

be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary
to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it"
(TMS, First.I.I., p. 3). 15 For economists trained in the neoclassical utilitarian tradition and the psychologists influenced by it, "pleasure" automatically implies utility, while a concern for the fortune (and happiness) of
others is about altruism. Smith is neither a utilitarian in the modern sense,
nor is he writing here about altruism. The word altruism did not enter the
English language for another century. 16 Smith's conception of "pleasure"
refers to the feeling of something good, not the mere ordinal ranking of
alternatives meant by modern utility maximization. In Smith's model, we
feel good about "mutual sympathy," which is being in a harmonious or
resonant relationship with others. Smith's relationship involves what the
modern reader would call "mutual empathy" although the word empathy
would not enter English for another 150 years. Empathy involves a capacity
to comprehend by your imagination what you would feel if you were in
another person's situation. But Smith's use of "fellow feeling" is especially
self-evident in conveying the meaning we want to capture, and we will use
his phrase. Here is a modern translation of the opening sentence that draws
on explanations as we see them subsequently developed in Sentiments:
However selfish we assume people to be, our capacity for mutual fellow
feeling guides us in learning context-dependent rules of conduct that
enable us to live in harmony with others.
Smith's most basic axiom in Sentiments is the Stoic principle of self-love,
that each person is best qualified to be concerned with, and to manage, his
own care (TMS, Second.II.II, p. 119; Seventh.II.II, p. 402; Seventh.II.III,
p. 445). This axiom, known as non-satiated preferences in modern choice
theory, did not lead Smith to base individual actions on some version of
utility maximization. How did Smith avoid the seemingly obvious neoclassical implication of non-satiation a la Jeremy Bentham, William Stanley
Jevons, Paul Samuelson, and modern game theory? Why did he not model
human decisions as choosing actions to maximize utility? From our study
of Sentiments we infer that in Smith's vision, common knowledge of selflove is what enables each person to judge from the context whether, and for

8

MODELING HUMAN ACTION

A good place to start in getting a grasp on Smith's model and manner of
thinking is to examine his opening sentence: "How selfish soever man may

15
12

13

14

For summaries, see Colin Camerer (2003, chapters 1, 2) and Smith (2008b, chapters 10,
11, 12).
See, e.g., Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher (2008) and Kevin McCabe, Mary
Rigdon, and Vernon Smith (2003).
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman and Cass Sunstein (2005).

16

9

Our notation for citing TMS is "Part.Section.Chapter, p. page(s)," for the Part, Section,
and Chapters explicitly numbered in the text. Sections or chapters that are implied but not
explicitly numbered as such in TMS are denoted in parentheses, e.g. Third.(I).VI, p. 250.
To be precise, altruism entered the English language in 1852. Thomas Dixon (2008) offers
a brilliant detailed study ofhow the word entered the English lexicon and how the concept
has been evolving ever since.
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whom, an action is beneficial or hurtful. An action is beneficial if it awards
more of a resource (money, goods, or services) to another, and an action is
hurtful if it provides less of a resource for another. The context of an action
is essential because the resulting outcomes can only acquire meaning
relative to the available decision alternatives defined by the context. For
a person who is concerned only with maximizing her own reward, information concerning what benefits or hurts others is entirely irrelevant, and
the context of an action has no significance as a signal sent by the decisionmaker or to be read by other persons like themselves. In contrast, Smith's
idea is that each of us, tacitly knowing that everyone strictly prefers more,
and strictly dis-prefers less, is in a position thereby to judge the beneficial
or hurtful intent of a person's action relative to alternatives that might be
chosen. Consequently, actions are messages, part of a conversation, to be
read as signals, responded to as signals, and in Smith such exchanges
constitute the foundations of human sociability.
In this model, context or circumstances is a core feature of interactive
decisions. Retrospectively, this is highly significant because in the 1980s and
1990s when experimental economists and cognitive psychologists observed
widespread and replicable deviations from self-interested choices in twoperson games like the ultimatum game, their explorations designed to find
17
out why these had occurred soon established that context mattered greatly.
Indeed, varying context seems to have a far bigger and more diverse impact
on observed decisions than varying payoff levels. These results were consistent with the model in Sentiments, but Smith's framework was not part of
our mode of thinking. The mechanism in Sentiments that causes context to
matter, that tempers and modifies the decision not to blindly follow one's
own utility maximization, is social. Each person adaptively learns to respond
in ways that ((humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to
something which other men can go along with" (TMS, Second.II.II, p. 120).
Social maturation involves learning to follow rules that satisfy fitness norms
or conventions that control the inconsiderate pursuit of one's self-interest.
Conducting one's self in an other-regarding manner is the result of exerting
the ((self-command" necessary to build, service, and maintain social capital.
Such learning is internalized as ethical, self-governing action.
Smith's socializing uses the common knowledge that everyone is selfloving to judge the propriety of conduct that is socially fit, and thereby

pursuing his own interest. For Smith there is no unresolved observed
contradiction between people pursuing their own interest, say in money,
and choosing actions that are other-regarding. One's own interest includes
living harmoniously and ethically with others, and choosing socially fit
actions. Sentiments provides a framework that well prepares us to examine
and study context, to understand social process, and that directs us away
from a focus only on outcomes and their payoffs whose social meaning can
only be derived from the context. Although the intellectual route has been
much different, such a focus on the consequences of actions describes
much of the recent history of piecemeal learning in experimental economics. Sentiments, we contend, integrates our modern relearning into
a consistent whole. Smith's model is consistent with the modern findings
in experimental economics and does not require modification in the light
of evidence. Sentiments does, however, require a contemporary interpretation in its applications to modern findings.
The core message we develop from Sentiments is that humans are otherregarding in their personal interactions because we learn to follow rules of
conduct that permit us to live in the company of our fellow human
beings. 18 Such rules are situation-sensitive to the effect of our actions on
the benefits and hurts of others, as well as to our own self. The human
capacity for fellow feeling, in particular for mutual fellow feeling, is the
primary mechanism through which we are socialized creatures. Without
such innate capabilities, honed as practiced skills, there would be no
human sociality in Smith's world. We are not other-regarding because
we reductively prefer to be social, but through human empathy we come, as
Robert Burns puts it, to "see oursels as ithers see us." In plain and
unmistakably clear language Smith says: "Though it may be true ... that
every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts
according to this principle" (TMS, Second.II.II, p.120).
Here is the logic of Smith's system in Sentiments, as we interpret,
develop, and apply it in this book: People have common knowledge that
all are self-interested and are locally non-satiated - more is always better,
less is always worse from any reference state. Otherwise, we cannot be
socially competent rule-followers because we cannot be sensitive to who
benefits or who is hurt by our actions, and to properly balance concern for
18

17

For example, Smith's (2008b) chapter 10 is entitled "The Effect of Context on Behavior,"
but the theme derives from experimental findings not from theory and not from
Sentiments.

11

Smith's model allows for diverse cultural adaptations since how others see us is subject to
cultural variation even within Western European societies and their global extension, but
this theme is beyond the scope of systematic exploration in this work.

12
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ourselves and concern for others. Our rule-following judgments are highly
context dependent. The situation, and the pattern of benefits or hurts,
together effect the action chosen. What enables such sociability is our
capacity for mutual fellow-feeling; we cannot reach maturity without
being shaped to a highly variable extent by our experience of others and
the mark they leave on our development. Our desire for praise and
praiseworthiness, and to avoid blame and blameworthiness emerges from
this maturation. Smith's model leads to key propositions on intentional
acts of beneficence and injustice that invoke corresponding thoughts and
feelings of gratitude and resentment.

Samuel Alexander's clear-eyed but forgotten, early twentieth-century summary states what separated Hume and Smith, and that which we seek to
develop in this book (1933, p. 249, our italics):
Like the utilitarians who came after him, ... [Hume] looked ultimately to the
effects of action in the way of giving pleasure or pain. Adam Smith, with a surer eye,
declared the sympathy which determines our approbation or disapprobation, not
so much to be directed towards the effects of actions as to the impulses from which
the action proceeds. He considered our actions in their origin rather than in their

outcome.

THE CIVIL ORDER OF PROPERTY EVOLVED
FROM THE SOCIAL ORDER OF PROPRIETY

HUME, SMITH, AND UTILITARIANISM

In an important passage, Smith cites Hume's appeal to utility (usefulness)
as a principal cause of human sentiments. Smith, however, disavows utility
as the source of conscious individual motivation, though it may have the
effect of utilitarian efficiency (TMS, Fourth.(I).II, pp. 270-71, our italics):
The same ingenious and agreeable author [David Hume] who first explained why
utility pleases, has been so struck with this view of things, as to resolve our whole
approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from
the appearance of utility. No qualities of the mind he observes, are ap~roved of as
virtuous, but such as are useful or agreeable either to the person himself or to
others; and no qualities are disapproved of as vicious but such as have a contrary
tendency. And Nature, indeed, seems to have so happily adjusted our sentiments of
approbation and disapprobation, to the conveniency both of the in~ividual an~ ~f
the society, that after the strictest examination it will be found, I believe, that this is
universally the case. 19 But still I [Adam Smith] affirm, that it is not the view of t~is

utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or principal source of ou~ approbation
and disapprobation. These sentiments are no doubt enhanced and enlivened by the
perception of the beauty or deformity which results from this utili~ or hurtft~.lness.
But still, I say, they are originally and essentially different from this perception.

Smith's explanation of conduct is always rooted in mutual fellow feeling.
Only after we understand how individuals experience each other should we
enquire after its efficacy for the individual and society. Hume was close to
the neoclassical utilitarian tradition; Smith was not. The philosopher
19

Smith does not disagree with Hume, that human action will be efficient, will maximize
utilitarian welfare, but that does not explain why people choose the actions they do. Smith
wants carefully to distinguish the actions that people take based on how they see and
experience the world, from the larger ends their actions may achieve. It is a version of t~e
invisible hand metaphor. People achieve ecologically rational ends not part of their
intentions or prevision.

13

Property in its modern use means ownership, or something that carries
with it a right to exclude and have unrivaled access to for one's own
individual or social purposes. More fundamentally "ownership" is
derived from expectations established by consent. We commonly
think of property as having its origin in the civil order of government.
Strong cultural traditions, including trade, however, are far older than
nations, and we must expect property to have ancient origins in social
rules like "thou shalt not steal, bear false witness, or covet the possessions of thy neighbor.>' Stealing and lying are hurtful to others, and
coveting corrupts our moral capacity for self-command. The origins of
the social order of propriety were in human sentiment, and the practiced norms of the social order naturally underpinned the rules of
property.
Concerning the origins of property, it is informative that in the century
before Smith wrote, scholars used the words propriety and property interchangeably. Propriety and property are both descendants of the AngloNorman proprete, the Old French propriete, and the Latin proprietas.
Proprietas itself is derivative of the ancient adverb proprie, meaning "exclusively, particularly, peculiarly, and properly." 20 Whereas John Locke used
propriety in the early version of Two Treatises of Government, in many
instances he changes to the use of property in later revisions. 21
In Sentiments the rules that apply to human conduct govern the propriety
20

21

Prior to the time of Sir Edward Coke, English lawyers used proprietas, proprete, and
property interchangeably in disputes about chattels. For detailed discussion and references, see Bart Wilson (2017).
See Stephen Buckle (1991, pp. 172-73).
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of individual actions (Part First of Sentiments is entitled "Of the Propriety
of Action"), and conduct is expressed in actions governed by consensus.
Smith always refers explicitly to the propriety or impropriety of intentional
action. The laws of justice, including property, in the civil order of government evolve directly from the conventions governing the propriety of
everyday action. The impropriety of hurtful actions is met with resentment, and the resentment brings measured punishment responses in
retaliation: "As the greater and more irreparable the evil that is done, the
resentment of the sufferer runs naturally the higher" (TMS, Second.II.II,
p. 121).
Hence, in the civil order, justice is attained through sanctions aimed at
punishing the perpetrator, and thereby avenging the natural resentment of
the victim, wherever the laws of justice are breached. 22 Prevent or avenge
intentionally hurtful acts of injustice, and you achieve justice. For Smith
the "laws of justice" are negative. They specify actions that are unjust and
subject to resentful retaliation if infractions occur. People have wide liberty
to take any action that is not unjust. Imagine society as a large playing field
within which people are free to pursue their own aspirations, careers, and
business plans as they choose but governed always by rules that prohibit
and recompense foul play. Any outcome of action - mediocrity, success,
failure, riches, admiration - is acceptable so long as no fouls are committed. The individual is free to excel, as in a race, but not to cheat or lie or
jostle others in the race.
PROPERTY, THE PROPENSITY TO EXCHANGE,
AND WEALTH CREATION

Smith develops the foundation for understanding economic development
in Sentiments. Property - the universal human custom of mutually recognizing what is mine and thine - is necessary but not sufficient, and in
Wealth he adds a key axiom: The human "propensity to truck, barter and
exchange." Just as disinterested commerce underlies the social order,
Smith's axiom is simply an extension of human sociability to interested
22

Note that the punishment response to acts of injustice is not utilitarian, distinguishing
Smith's jurisprudence from modern law and behavioral law and economics (Fabrizio
Simon 2016). As in Alexander, quoted above, the origin of the hurtful act was an
intentional violation of fair play; the resentment of the victim (the origin of what offends)
must be recompensed. Smith says it is the resentment and the impulse to punish in return
that is addressed by the rules we follow; relationships are about not committing fouls,
achieving justice by fair play.
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commerce; it is "commerce" all the way up, from neighborly social
exchange to the extended order of impersonal markets. 23
In the neoclassical tradition, the modern economic model begins with
dispersed information on preferences, resources, and technology, then
applies Max-U to deduce prices and allocations. In Wealth the primitives are not tastes, costs, and technology, but the observed human
propensity to trade, a propensity founded on two people improving
their own non-satiated condition by exchanging one thing for another
in but another social and ethical interaction. An immediate consequence of trading is new information prices that people experience,
observe, or learn about through gossip. Price information allows individuals to make comparisons between what is and what might be.
A price for corn and for hogs allows the individual producer, based
on his local circumstances, to ask if he can benefit by producing more
hogs and less corn. In principle, as in modern preference theory based
on perfect complete-ordering information, he could make any such
comparison without prices, but it would be cognitively far more complex without prices to ease the mental calculus of comparison. Do I get
more corn by growing it or through pig-corn exchange, selling pigs and
buying corn? The formation of prices enables him better to discover
preferences and costs through experience, and to seek information that
is relevant for decision and innovation. Across markets and nationally,
such discovery leads to labor specialization - a fundamental source of
wealth creation. Although people intend their own benefit, the laws of
justice channel their actions to enable others and the nation to
prosper. 24
In both Sentiments and Wealth action is driven by discovery in a world
of uncertainty and consequences that are unknown until attempted:
through repeat social interactions and trade, people adapt their responses
to better themselves as well as others through gains from exchange.
Experimental economists observe such a process every time we conduct
23

24

If you doubt the claim, consider the breadth of meanings of commerce listed in the
dictionary, which in the Oxford English Dictionary include: (la) exchange between
men of the products of nature or art, buying and selling together; (2a) intercourse in
the affairs of life, dealings; (2c) intercourse or converse with God, with spirits, passions,
thoughts, etc.; and (3) intercourse of the sexes; esp. in a bad sense [which is proper British
for "sex"].
Bernard Mandeville, who irreverently founded economic decision-making on the vice of
self-love in The Fable of the Bees, and whose satirical, tongue-in-cheek humor scandalized
Smith, nevertheless still concluded: "So Vice is beneficial found, I When it is by Justice
lopt and bound" (1705).
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a market experiment. 25 What was already articulated in SU:ith's twoc~ooks
could be summarized elegantly by Hayek over two centuries later: Rules
alone can unite an extended order.... Neither all ends pursued, nor all
means used, are known or need be known to anybody, in order for them to
be taken account of within a spontaneous order. Such an order forms of
itself' (1988, pp. 19-20).
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